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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

THE STAT'E OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

No. 9712

COY RINGO,
Defend-omt and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STAT'EMENT
The parties will be referred to throughout the Brief
by their given names, or as the ST'ATE AND DEFENDANT~

Pages cited by statements concerning evidence will
refer to the Reporter's Transcript of Testimony, and the.
record of the case on appeal.
All Italics are mine.
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STATEMENT' OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a Jury Verdict finding the
defendant, Coy Ringo, guilty of the crime of malicious
aforethought assault on a convict in the Utah State,
Prison with an instrument, namely, a laundry pin, contrary to the provisions of Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 12,
Utah Co~de Annotated, 1953, as amended by the laws of
the State of Utah, 1961.
At the trial of the defendant, he was represented by
a Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq.
Thereafter, the Court appointed Dwight L. King to
represent the defendant, and to perfect this Appeal.
All statements concerning the facts are based on the
record on appeal, and the transcript of evidence on
appeal since the present Counsel for the defendant has
no personal knowledge of any occurrence and must rely
therefor solely upon the Record made by the Trial Court.
On December 30, 1961, defendant was a convict in
the Utah State Prison, committed on August 6th, 1958.
(R. 85) Defendant was assigned to the Section lmown as
B-North of the State Prison, a maximum security section.
Also assigned to Section B-North was a convict by
the name of Howard LeRoy Ollerdisse.
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Defendant, between 11:00 o'clock and 12:30 left his
cell No. 213 and entered an area known .as "Inmate
Security Area'' as shown on Exhibit 13, and in the
inmate security area, he, and the inmate Ollerdisse
commenced an .affray. As soon as the guards were able,
the two convicts were replaced in their respective cells,
defendant in 213, and Ollerdisse in 209. The doors to
both cells were closed and both men were immediately
subjected to physical examinations. Exactly how the
defendant obtained access to the inmate security area, at
the same time as Ollerdisse was in said area is not shown,
by the evidence, although it is hinted at by the witnesses
that he in some way jammed the mechanism which locked
his cell and in this way kept the cell open until Ollerdisse
came into the inmate Security area.
The affray between Ollerdisse and defendant was
witnessed by guards who testified concerning the fact
that both Ollerdisse and defendant struck several blows
at their opponent in the affray.
An examination of Ollerdisse revealed that he had
two punctured type wounds, one in the abdomen, .and one
in his rib cage. The punctured type wound in the abdomen had caused internal bleeding to the point where
Ollerdisse was required to undergo surgical repair of
the wound in his stomach at the· Salt Lake County
Hospital.
The guards at the State Prison immediately followSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing the affray and after the convicts had been returned
to their respective cells, while the convicts were out of
the cells, conducted a shake-down of the cell and searched
the convicts. No we.apon was ever found which could be
responsible for the wound in Ollerdisse's stomach and
chest.
The State introduced two Exhibits, one a Laundry
pin which had been straightened out, and the other a
laundry pin which had not been straightened out, and it!
is the claim of the State that a similar laundry pin
straightened out was the weapon, or instrument, which
the defendant used on the convict Ollerdisse.
There was no evidence that anyone ever s.aw such a
weapon in the hand of defendant, and with the exception
of statements made by the defendant himself, outside of
the Trial Court, there is no evidence whatsoever to
connect a laundry pin with the defendant or with the
wound which the convict, Ollerdisse, suffered.
The only evidence connecting laundry pins or any
weapon with the defendant is testimony by Ferris Andrus
and Ernest D. Wright. They testified about a statement
which the defendant gave when questioned about the
affr.ay. At the time Andrus questioned the defendant,
there was present Andrus who is deputy Sheriff of Salt
Lake County, the Deputy Warden, Fitzgerald, Ernest
Wright, Execut,ive Director of the Pardon Board, and Lt.
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Jooston. (R. 229, 230, 231) The conversation with defendant took about between 35· minutes to an hour. Defendant was not represented by Counsel. Andrus did not
inform Ringo he was charged with any crime, that he
had a right to be represented by Counsel, did not tell
him that he had a right not to incriminate himself, nor
apparently was defendant informed that he did not have
to discuss the occurrence with Ollerdisse. (R. 234, 235,
236) No promises were made to the defendant, nor
threats of force used against him. (R. 241) Witness
Wright agrees that defendant was never informed about
being charged, that he had a right to Counsel, but
disagrees with Andrus, concerning whether or not Andrus
informed defendant that whatever he said would be
used against him in Court. (R. 243, 244)
Proper objections were taken by Counsel on the
ground that no proper foundation had been laid, and
that the statements made by the defendant were not
voluntary. (R. 245) Counsel also moved the Court to
strike and exclude Andrus and Wright's testimony on
the ground that they violated the defendant's rights
under the Federal and State Constitution. (R. 2'92)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER
SECTION 12, ARTICLE 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN THAT HE WAS COMPELLED
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF.
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.ARGUMENT·
POINT I.
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER
SECTION 12, ARTICLE 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN THAT HE WAS COMPELLED
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF.

The defendant, at the time he w.as questioned by
the Deputy Sheriff, Executive Director, Deputy Warden,
and other officials at the State Prison, was in the maximum security section of the prison. Evidence showed
that his cell was, in effect, a solit.ary confinement cell,
that there were solid steel doors on the front of the cell
which were closed each night from 4:30 P.M. until 8
o'clock the next morning. The force of prison discipline
could well be appreciated by the defendant.
The circumstances, it is submitted, are calcul.ated to
impress upon the mind of the defendant, the great power
that the Deputy Warden and the other prison officials
h.ad over him, and which, if his conduct was less than
cooperative, they had full power to discipline him for.
It is submitted that under the circumstances his statements in answer to the· questions by Andrus were not
voluntarily given. He had not come to the hearing at
his own request and he certainly was under duress and
in a position where his will was not effective. He was
involuntarily incarcer:ated and disciplined.
The right against self incrimination has long been
carefully guarded, not only by the Federal, but by the
State Courts, and there is a gre.a t abundance of judicial
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precedence concerning the protections that the defendant
is entitled to do.
In St(J)te v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 229 P 2d. 289, this
Court considered the question of whether or not a confession was voluntary and pointed out that certain conduct was important to protect constitutional rights of
the defendant. They include that fact, that the defendant
was not subject to physical discomfort, and "defendant
was fully informed of his rights." (P. 292) Defendant
was never informed about his rights before the confession nor even informed that an investigation for a crime·
was under way. No waiver of rights by defendant here
is possible since no knowledge of rights was ever given.
It has been stated that the compulsion prohibited is
not alone physical or mental duress, such as comes from
unlawful commands and authoritative orders by those
engaged in extorting testimony, but comprehends also
the lesser degree of compulsion which subjects the citizen
to some ,important disadvantage to procure the evidence
which is desired, should they extract it from him. U. S.
v. Bell, 81 Fed. 830, Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup.
Ct., 524, 29 L. E,d 746.
It is defendant's position that because of the force,
apparent and actual, that the Deputy Warden and the
other officials had over him, he was compelled to answer
all questions that were submitted to him.
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Section 64-9-39 U CA 1953, gives to the Warden and
D·eputy Warden permiss,ion to punish convicts for misconduct. The only restrictions being that the convict
cannot be showered with cold water or whipped with a
lash on the bare body. Defendant was already under
strict discipline, being kept in solitary confinement, it
seems unH!kely that he would not he aware of the power
the Deputy Warden had and what could happen to him
if he refused to cooperate.

Under State and Federal Constitutions, the rule for
State Courts must be that no person shall, at any time,
he compelled to answer any question, or s.ay anything
which might be confession of commission of public offense, or which might be used against him rin an attempt
to convict him of public offense. See authorities cited
by this Court in St~ate v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 229 P 2d.,
289 p. 292; Layman v. Webb, 350 P. 2d 323.
It has always been the rule that a confession may be
regarded as obtained by compulsion, and therefore in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, where the defendant
was not advised of his rights. U. S. v. Kallas, 272 Fed.
742. The Federal rule and probably the Utah rule was
set down in the Kallas case.
"Testimony as to a confession upon a trial is
admissible in evidence, though not sufficient to
convict; but the Court is now asked to go a step
further, and hold that the alleged confession
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obtained by an inquisition to which the accused
was subjected while held in jail, at the mercy of
his jailer, is admissible, without first showing that
it was freely and voluntarily made, .after the
accused was fully advised of his rights and
warned of his danger." (P. 74·6)
"Upon the question of what constitutes compulsion, within the meaning of constitutional
provisions simil.ar to the fifth amendment, the
following synopsis is taken from Words and
Phrases. Vol. 2, p. 1351.
''Const. art. 1, Sec. 6, declares that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case· to be a
witness against himself. Held, that the word
'compulsion' as there used, means merely compulsion exercised through the process of the
Courts, or through laws acting directly on the
party, and has no reference whatever to an indirect or argumentative pressure, such .as is
claimed is exerted by Act 1869 (Laws 1869, c,
678) declaring that on a criminal trial the accused
shall at his own request, but not otherwise,
be deemed a competent witness against himself.
People v. Courtney, 94 N.Y. 490, 493." (P. 751)
(5) "The accused may be presumed to know
the law - that is, th.at any statements or admissions which he voluntarily makes will be used
against him ; but he will also be presumed to
know that he will not be compelled to be a witness
against himself and that involuntary statements
cannot be used in evidence against him. Hence,
the question for determination is whether, in the
absence of evidence that the accused was comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pelled to make the statements attributed to him
- that is, evidence other than that of his imprisonment or arrest - they can be considered
as evidence against him. Even if he were advised
that he was not compelled to answer .and that
statements which he made might be used in evidence against him, while constituting prima facie
evidence that the statements were voluntarily
made, .and therefore admiss,ible in evidence, it
would not be conclusive for the examination of a
detained prisoner might be so prolonged, and
of such a character, and made under such circumstances, that .a court might reasonably conclude that it was not voluntary, even though he
was so warned.
''The questioning by or with the consent of
his official captor of a prisoner is essentially
inquisitorial in its nature. He is confined, .and
perforce must submit to such questions. True,
he may remain silent; but he cannot escape the
questions, as he mright if he were physically free.
The actual existence of duress, arising from the
fact that he is confined .and cannot escape his
questioner, is sufficient, and requires that he be
advised that he is not compelled to answer, and,
if he does so, his answers will be used against
him. Fairness can require no less. So much .at
least is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
How can it be said, if a court required an accused
to answer upon the witness chair, with the alternative of going to jail if he refused, was such
compulsion as to invalidate the evidence so obtained, and, at the same time, that a prisoner
questioned in jail by his captor was not compelled
to give evidence against himself?
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"Such a course would be to very nearly, if
not quite, blind oneself as to what constitutes
compulsion. As above pointed out, the compulsion forbidden by the amendment - or at least
included ~n its prohibition - is compulsion exercised through the process of the court. The com~
mitment by which the petitioner in the present
case was held in jail is no less compelling process
than were he in court and ordered upon the witness chair for examination. In fact, there is
greater need to safeguard the rights of the accused ~n this particular, when under arrest, than
in the court, for in court ,a record is made that
will, eventually, afford protection, however great
the abuse practiced. It may not always be so of
the prisoner subjected to an inquisition in his
cell.
"While it may be that many know of their
rights, and, even when in prison, have the will
and courage to stand upon them, there certainly
are others who do not. The safer and better
course to pursue is to require evidence that each
and every prisoner has been advised of his right
to remain silent, and warned of the danger in
speaking, before any statement made is admitted,
rather than enter upon a more or less speculative
inquiry as to whether the statements of accused
were made voluntarily or not. In the nature of
things, it often happens, not only upon the examination in the jail, but upon that in court regarding the circumstances of the inquiry at the jail,
that there are many against one, the accused.
Whether it arises from zeal or prejudice, born of
their calling, the nature of the accusation or
situation, or all of these and other things, it does
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not matter - consciously, or unconsciously, upon
such inquisition, the police, .and officers having
similar duties, often array themselves against
the accused. An instance of this is to be noted in
the present case. While both of the witnesses for
the prosecution were asiked to tell all that accused
said when he w.as examined at the jail, it remained for the leading questions of the attorney
for the accused to elicit the fact that the accused
was a discharged soldier of the late war, .although
many things had been upon direct examination
recounted, no more pertinent, but which would
not reflect such credit upon the accused.
''The demurrer to the petition will be overruled." p. 753

CON.CLUSION

It is respectfully submitted th.at defendant has been
deprived of his constitutional rights to not give evidence
against himself. The Judgment of the Court should be
set aside.
Respectfully submitted
DWIGHT L. KING
Counsel for Defendant
2121 South State Street
8alt Lake City, Utah
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